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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
•ooOooSTATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of
No. 14297
SUMMERS CHILDREN,
Persons under 18 years of age.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This Is an action seeking the termination of parental
rights of Orin John Wulfferstein, the father of Tommy Summers
(June 23, 1970) and Tina Marie Summers (July 18, 1971), under
the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated §55-10-109
(1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court.

From an Order

terminating the parental rights of Orin John Wulfferstein,
he appeals.

From an Order denying the Motion to Produce
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Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for New Trial
filed on behalf of Orin John Wulffenstein, he appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
/Appellant Orin John Wulffenstein seeks reversal of
the Order terminating his parental rights and judgment in
his favor as a matter of law.

In the alternative, Appellant

Wulffenstein seeks reversal of the Order denying his Motion
to Produce Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for
New Trial and judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A petition to terminate parental rights was filed on
March 2, 1972, as to the natural mother, Yvonne Viola Summers
A supplemental petition was filed on November 14, 1972, so as
to include the natural father, Orin John Wulffenstein, the
Appellant in this case.

At the time the two petitions were

filed, Appellant was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison
and had been so confined since February, 1971.
released on May 15, 1973.

He was

From July 26, 1973 to August,

1974, he was incarcerated in the Salt Lake City and County
Jail, pursuant to charges which were subsequently dismissed.
He was transferred from the jail to the Utah State Prison
in August, 1974, and was subsequently paroled to the Odyssey
House rehabilitation facility in Salt Lake City.
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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He dis-

appeared from Odyssey House on October 23, 1974, and his
whereabouts were unascertained until May 10, 1975.

After

his reappearance he was returned to the Utah State Prison
where he is presently incarcerated.
For reasons unknown to Appellant, the hearings
conducted on the petition to terminate his parental rights
were not conducted until over two years after the petition
was filed.

He was available for appearance up until the

time of his disappearance from Odyssey House.

The hearing

was conducted at three sessions, on February 5, March 12, and
May 8, all in 1975.

Appellant did not attend nor was he

aware of these proceedings.

The Court entered an Order

terminating Appellant's parental rights on May 9, 1975.
The parental rights of the natural mother were previously
terminated on June 26, 1974, and she is now deceased.

There

were not then nor are there now other persons desiring to
adopt Appellant's minor children.

In the Order terminating

the parental rights of Appellant, the Court set a hearing
for review of the matter on September 11, 1975.
Oh September 9, the review hearing was conducted.
At the hearing arguments were advanced concerning a Motion
to Produce Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for
New Trial and on Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, both filed on behalf of Appellant.

The Court entered

-3-
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an Order denying the motion and objection on September 16,
1975.

Attached to this Brief is a copy of an affidavit

of Appellant, stating the testimony and evidence he would
have offered on his behalf had the Court granted his request
do so do and pertaining to his attitude toward resuming
custody of his minor children,
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMANENTLY
DEPRIVING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS.
The Statutory Grounds for Termination were
not Established Under the Facts and
Circumstances of this Case.
Utah Code Annotated §55-10-109(1)

sets forth the basis for deprivation of parental rights.
It provides as follows:

(1) The Court may decree a termination
of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the Court finds:
(a) That the parent or parents are
unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct
or condition seriously detrimental to the
child; or
(b) That the parent or parents have
abandoned the child. It shall be prima
facie evidence of abandonment that the
parent or parents, although having legal
custody of the child, have surrendered
physical custody of the child, and for a
period of six months following such
surrender have not manifested to the child
or to the person having the physical custody
of the child a firm intention to resume
physical custody or to make arrangements
for the care of the child; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A third ground for termination, U.C.A. S55-10-109(1)(c) , is
not reprinted since it is neither applicable to the instant
case nor has it been asserted by the parties.

The trial

Court concluded that the minor children of Appellant

came

within the provisions of U.C.A, §55-10-109.
A Court is prohibited from depriving a parent of the
custody of its child unless it finds from the evidence the
necessary facts required to be found for that purpose.
Appellant contends that he has neither abandoned his minor
children nor is he unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct
or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, and
that therefore the statutory grounds for termination
parental

rights have not been
1•

of

satisfied.

Appellant Has Not Abandoned or Deserted
His Minor Children.

The legal standard for abandonment in Utah
is set forth by this Court in the case of In Re Adoption
of Walton, 123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), as follows:
...abandonment must be with a specific
intent to do so, - an intent to sever all
correlative rights and duties incident to
the relationship. Such intent must be
proved by him who asserts it, by proof that
not only preponderates, but which must be
clear and satisfactory, - s o m e t h i n g akin
to that degree of proof necessary to establish
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or, as
one authority put it "by clear and indubitable
evidence." Ld, at 883 (emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted).

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although

the instant case concerns termination of parental

rights, as opposed to an adoption which was contemplated

in

the Walton decision, Appellant submits that the standard
for abandonment is as stringent for termination of parental
rights as it is for adoption.

The factual

issue

concerned

in Walton was whether the parent had abandoned, the child
such that parental
to adopt the child.

consent was not required for another party
In the present case, there did not exist

a third party desiring to adopt the minor children.
the desirability

Thus

for a Court finding abandonment here is

diminished.
In applying the Walton principles of abandonment
the instant case, there has been no clear and

to

satisfactory

showing of an intent by Appellant to abandon his minor

children.

The Findings of Fact entered by the trial Court state that
Appellant has (1) not provided financial

support; (2) had

little or no contact; and (3) not manifested an intent to
resume custody.

While the third finding is not conceded by

Appellant and is attacked, infra, these Findings are nonetheless insufficient to establish the specific intent
in the Walton

required

standard.

This Court elaborated on the concept of abandoment
in the case of In Re Adoption of Jameson, 20 U.2d 5 3 , 432
P.2d 881 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , where the factual

issue presented was again

whether the parent had abandoned the child such that
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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g ue d

to incarceration support a finding of abandonment.
The Maestas decision offers additional

reasons why

the adoption decisions of this Court are good authority in
resolving the abandonment issue in a termination of parental
rights proceeding, at least under the facts and circumstances
of this case.

The resolution of the abandonment question

does not contemplate the best interests of the child, but
is limited to the standard of abandonment.

As the Court

stated:
The trial court properly held that the
question of the welfare of the child is
not material in a judicial determination
of abandonment. Where the custody of the
child is being determined, as in a case
of habeas corpus, the welfare of the child
is of paramount importance. However, in
the instant matter the custody of the child
was not directly involved. The controversy
was as to whether or not the father had
abandoned the child so that an adoption
might be had without his consent thereto
being given in writing. Jjd, at 494 (emphasis
supplied, footnotes o m i t t e d ) .
In the present case, as in the adoption cases, the custody
of the minor children is not directly involved.
does not seek custody at this time

Appellant

nor could he, due to

his incarceration, but is concerned with retaining his
parental rights upon release.

Thus while the welfare of

the children is pertinent to a custody proceeding, it has
no bearing on the initial determination as to whether the
parent has abandoned the child.
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Thus incarceration based on conviction of a felony is not
conduct or a condition which is considered by itself to be
seriously detrimental to the children in Utah today,.

To

the same effect is Jameson, Supra; see also Fronk v. State,
7 U.2d 245, 322 P.2d 397 ( 1 9 5 8 ) .

The inquiry today is one

which focuses upon the effect on the children rather than
specific conduct or condition.

Thus a correlation

between

the alleged aggressive criminal

behavior and the escape of

Appellant and its effect upon the children must be shown,
rather than the fact in and of itself.

This

requirement

of correlation is examplified in the Lance holding, which
concluded there to be insufficient evidence to support a
finding of behavior seriously detrimental to the children.
In the absence of such a showing of correlation,
the alleged aggressive criminal behavior and escape go no
farther than mere incarceration, and thus do not demonstrate
conduct or condition seriously detrimental

to the children.

Appellant submits that such a correlation does not exist
under the facts and circumstances of this case nor was it
shown at the trial

court.

To illustrate this

proposition,

it can be shown that in this case Appellant's absence from
Odyssey House has nothing really to do with his children,
nor was the length of the departure of such duration to
disinterest in the children.

Further discussion of the

-10-
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f

ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that all of the rights of the
father, Orin John Wulffenstein, including
residual rights be and they are hereby
fully and completely terminated; . . .
and said matter is set for review
September 11, 1975.
Appellant subsequently filed an objection to the above
Findings and Conclusions as not being consistent with the
evidence presented, which was denied.

Appellant at this

time reasserts his objection to the above Findings and
Conclusions, and contends that the denial of his objection
was in error such that the order terminating his parental
rights must be reversed.
In the Findings of Fact it is stated that Appellant
is emotionally unstable and cannot provide the security,
stability and modeling necessary for his minor children.
In reality this statement was not a finding but a conclusion
based on the three subheadings under Finding No. 2.

Thus

this discussion focuses on the factual allegations of the
subheadings rather than conclusory statement, and Appellant
would contend that the conclusory statement is unfounded
and not supported by the record.
The Court found that Appellant has a long history of
aggressive criminal behavior, has been incarcerated in prison,
and has escaped from prison.

While Appellant concedes that

he has been incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, it is
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contended that the other two findings are in error.

First,

as to criminal history, Appellant submits that the
appropriate history to examine is that since the birth of
his minor children.

This is based upon the fact that during

the prior criminal history Appellant was a juvenile and that
this period does not accurately reflect his present character.
It is also based on the proposition that there must be a
correlation between the conduct or condition and the
consideration of terminating parental rights.

Since the

birth of his children, Appellant has been convicted of one
felony (burglary) for which he is now serving sentence at
the Utah State Prison.

The only other adult criminal

adjudication on the record before the trial court was a
revocation of parole, which was based on criminal charges
that were subsequently dismissed.

One adult felony conviction

and one parole violation are not sufficient to demonstrate
a history of criminal behavior.

As to escape, no evidence

was introduced that Appellant escaped from the Utah State
Prison nor has he ever so escaped.

Evidence was introduced

that he left Odyssey House against medical advice in October
1974, and a warrant was subsequently issued for his arrest
by the Utah State Board of Pardons.

However, he has not

been charged nor convicted of escape with regard to leaving
Odyssey House.

Thus it was error to find that Appellant

escaped from the Utah State Prison.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court also made findings which purported to
show abandonment by Appellant of his children.

The

findings that he has not provided financial support and
that he has had little or no contact with the children
do not support a showing of abandonment for reasons
elaborated in POINT I.A.

Again it must be pointed out

that Appellant has been incarcerated for the substantial
duration of his children's lives and thus unable to support
or contact them.

The finding that he has not manifested

any intention to resume custody of said children is not
supported by the record, and in fact is clearly refuted by
testimony offered in evidence by the State of Utah.

The

record discloses that most of the witnesses never discussed
the family relations in interview with Appellant,, and the
testimony of the children's social worker demonstrates
Appellant's continuing desire to have eventual custody of
his children (Transcript, p. 18, In. 21-25; p. 20, In. 30
to p. 21, In. 10; p. 22, In. 12-14).

Thus a finding of

no intent to resume custody, where such intent has been
shown in testimony not refuted elsewhere in the record,
is clearly error.

The finding that Appellant's whereabouts

are unknown is only partially true.

While his wereabouts

were concededly unknown as of the date the Findings were
entered by the Court, his whereabouts as of the date the
the review hearing was conducted in September, 1975, were
known.
-14-
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The grant of the review hearing impliedly contemplated that
the previous Findings were not necessarily final, but would
encompass subsequent events up to the date set for review.
Thus it was error to make a finding that Appellant's
whereabouts were unknown, without modifying such a finding
upon Appellant's return prior to the review hearing.
Since it was error to find that Appellant is unfit
or incompetent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously
detrimental to the children, or that he abandoned the
children, since in each case the underlying reasons for
each finding were not supported by the record, it was error
in turn to conclude that Appellant's children were within
the provisions of U.C.A. §55-10-109(1), and to terminate
Appellant's parental rights.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PRODUCE
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and
Decree ordering the termination of Appellant's parental
rights on May 9, 1975, and set a hearing date for review of
the matter in September.

Prior to the hearing date,

Appellant's whereabouts were ascertained, his parole
revoked, and he was subsequently transferred to the Utah
State Prison.

Appellant's attorney filed a motion to produce

additional testimony and alternative request for a new trial
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on July 16, 1975, for the reason that Appellant was unavailable for past proceedings and was desirous of giving
testimony in his own behalf and of obtaining custody of
the minor children.

The motion was denied on September 16,

1975,
A.

The Denial of Appellant's Motion
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion.

Courts have not hesitated to build a strong fortress
around the parent-child relationship, and have stocked it
with ammunition in the form of established rules and policies
that add to its impregnability.

This paraphrased axiom

of Justice Henroid is demonstrated by the judicial

policy

of reluctance in Utah to permanently sever family relationships.

The Court has repeatedly noted such judicial

reluctance, which was perhaps best expressed in State v.
Lance, supra.:
Deprivation of the parent f s custody of
their children is a drastic remedy which
should be resorted to only in extreme
cases and when it is manifest that the
home itself cannot or will not correct
the evils which exist. The cutting of
family ties is a step of utmost gravity
and is undesirable both socially and
economically and should be avoided unless
that is the only alternative to be found
consistent with the best interests of the
chi Idren . Iji. , at 397.
The Lance decision reflects a composite of principles
expressed by Justice Crockett in the earlier decision of
-16-
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State v. Dade, 14 U.2d 47, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).

Both Lance

and Dade concerned deprivation of custody proceedings and
are pertinent to the case at bar.

In Fronk v. State,

supra, this Court reversed an order terminating parental
rights and stressed the importance of the family relationship
stating:
It [the juvenile court] was not created
for the purpose of substituting persons,
other than the natural parents, to take
over the children. It should seek in every
way, short of such a substitution, to
preserve and maintain that bond of parental
affection which has been throughout the
existence of mankind the most potent force
for safeguarding the interest and welfare
of the oncoming generation. Jjd, at 402.
Thus, the Utah Courts approach termination of parental rights
proceedings with a preconceived reluctance to break family
ties.
Beyond the judicial reluctance to interfere with
parental rights, there exists a strong presumption that the
natural parents are best suited for raising their children.
This presumption has been noted by this Court on numerous
occasions and was best expressed in the decision of In Re
State, 11 U.2d 393, 360 P.2d 486 (1961), which involved
efforts by the natural parents to regain custody of their
children:
Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly
recognized that there is a presumption
that it will be for the best interests
of the child to be raised under the care,
control and supervision of its natural
parents. Such presumption is only over-17-
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come when the trier of the facts is
convinced by the evidence that the
welfare of the child requires that the
child be awarded to someone other than
the natural parents. Thus, the ultimate
burden of proof on this question, is
always in favor of the natural parents
and against any other person seeking
custody of such child. Iji, at 397.
This presumption is also noted in State v. Lance and State
v. Dade, supra.

While this presumption can be rebutted, it

is strong presumption which will not be taken
With the judicial

lightly.

reluctance to terminate parental

rights and the presumption that it is in the best interests
of children to be in the custody of their parents in mind,
an examination of the facts in this case is appropriate.
The termination of parental

rights proceedings were conducted

in the absence of Appellant.

The State, while desiring to

place the children for adoption, had no affirmative plans
for adoption and no one in mind to assume the role of parent
for these children.
deceased.

The natural mother of the children is

Had Appellant been able to attend the termination

proceedings, he would have offered in evidence testimony on
his behalf and in rebuttal of the other evidence, as is
set forth in his Affidavit attached to this brief as the
Appendix.

His whereabouts were ascertained shortly after

the Order of the trial Court terminating his parental
and well before the review hearing was conducted.
-18-
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His

rights

intent of desiring to resume custody of his children
was promptly brought to the Court's attention.

Yet,,

despite all this, and in view of the aforementioned
judicial reluctance and parental presumption, the Court
refused to hear the additional testimony in reviewing the
matter.

The additional testimony, had it been allowed,

would have substantially consisted of the matters set
forth in the Appendix.

Appellant contends that the denial

of the opportunity to present the additional testimony
constituted an abuse of discretion.
The leading case in this jurisdiction on the abuse
of discretion standard in the custody setting is In Re State,
supra.

In that case, the parents had already had their

parental rights terminated, and sought restoration of
custody based on changed conditions approximately five months
later in a separate proceeding.

Their rights were terminated

in the abserrce of replacement guardians seeking to adopt
the children.

The trial Court refused to grant a hearing

on the parents 1 petition for restoration of custody.

On

appeal the parents made a proffer of the evidence that would
have been presented had a hearing been conducted, and argued
that it was error to deny them an opportunity to be heard.
This Court reversed the decision and directed the lower
-19-
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Court to conduct a hearing.
However, since the parents have
presented an issue of fact under which
the parents probably can make a showing
that the best interests of these children
requires that they be reared by their
natural parents, the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to give them
a hearing
Id, at 398-9 (emphasis added).
Appellant contends that the present case is squarely within
the facts and holding of this decision, and therefore that
it was an abuse of discretion to deny Appellant's motion
to produce additional testimony.

In this case, Appellant

has intervened shortly after his parental rights were
terminated and seeks to overturn the termination order.
His rights were terminated in the absence of replacement
guardians, and he was denied a hearing for the purpose of
offering testimony in his behalf.

Appellant now makes a

proffer of what testimony he would offer in evidence, had
he been afforded the chance, and contends that the trial
Court abused his discretion.
by two factors.

The appeal here is strengthened

First, Appellant's intervention is made

in the same proceeding which had already set a hearing date
for review.

Second, the parents in In Re State voiced no

objection to the appropriateness of previously terminating
their parental rights under the conditions existing at the
time.

In contrast, Appellant challenges the appropriateness

of the initial termination order under circumstances in
which he had no opportunity to present his position.

Thus,

In Re State appears to control the resolution of the abuse
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of discretion issue.
It is clear from the case law in Utah that this Cour
will reverse an order terminating parental rights where it
is shown that the trial Court abused its discretion.
In Fronk v. State, supra, this Court found such an abuse,
although the parent had been convicted of a felony, and
reversed the termination order.

The termination proceedings

were conducted in the absence of the appealing parent,
and did not contemplate a specific replacement guardian.
Thus, this decision seems to factually contemplate a
situation similar to the case at bar, and supports Appellant's
claim here as to an abuse of discretion.
There is a significant factual distinction between
proceedings conducted to terminate parental rights where
there is or is not a replacement guardian ready to assume
the role of parent to the minor children.

The significance

lies in the evaluation of the best interests of the child.
This distinction has been expressed as follows:
In contrast, in a juvenile court
proceeding for termination of parental
rights, the State seeks to sever the
parent-child relationship without
regard to whether another alternative
is available for the child. Here, the
action or nonaction by the parent and
its impact on the child must be judged
by asking whether the situation of the
cnild in the custody of the biological
parent is so bad as to warrant termination
even if the child remains in foster or
institutional care for the rest of his
minority. That is a qualitatively
-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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different question than making a
choice between known alternatives of
adoptive parent or biological parent.
Aaron, Utah Adoption, 1970 Utah Law
Review at 342-3 (footnotes omitted,
emphasis a d d e d ) .
The thrust of Professor Aaron's comments as applied to a
situation like the case at bar is that where the State does
not have affirmative plans for adoption of the children,
the termination of parental

rights at this point serves no

purpose and therefore does not comport to the objective
of termination.

The issue of termination in such a situation

thus should not rise until there are present

identifiable

persons to adopt and assume the role of parent.
very fact of terminating parental

Thus, the

rights under the facts

and circumstances of this case suggest that an abuse of
discretion has occurred.
When viewing as a whole the judicial reluctance to
terminate parental rights, the presumption that the parent
is best suited to have custody of his children, the case
law in Utah on abuse of discretion in termination

proceedings,

the objectives of termination and the distinction where no
replacement guardian is present, and the facts and
circumstances of this case, the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion in denying Appellant's motion to produce
additional

testimony.
B.

Appellant was Improperly Denied an
Opportunity to be Heard Consistent
with Constitutional Principles of
Due Process of Law.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

In Re State, supra, this Court suggested (although

did not hold) that the denial in granting a hearing to the
adoptive parents by the trial Court may have suffered from
a lack of due process of law.
Also,'it is very unusual for a Court
to attempt to determine facts without
hearing all of the evidence available
which has a bearing on that question.
This is particularly true in a case
where the trial Court is called upon
to determine a complicated question
such as, what will be most beneficial
to the child. Ordinarily to refuse to
hear all the evidence available on an
issue of fact would be a violation of
due process of law. Xd, 397-8.
This Court went on to state that, under the particular facts
of that case, there probably was no lack of due process,
but resolution of this issue was rendered unnecessary since
the denial of the hearing was held to constitute an abuse
of discretion and thus reversible error.
Justice Henroid, in a well reasoned opinion concurring
with the In Re State

majority, would have found a denial of

due process of law. After first noting the fact in that case
the juvenile court, in its order depriving the parents of
custody, specifically retained continuous jurisdiction until
an adoption was granted by an appropriate court, the opinion
commented upon the implications of such a reservation.
Having done so, without specifying the
precise purpose therefore, I am of the
opinion that in this particular case
inherently was included in such
reservation of jurisdiction, a requirement
that the least that could be done upon
petition for restoration of custody would
be to hear the natural parents out in -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eleventh hour hope that it could be
established that a sincere effort had
been made on the part of the parents
to preserve the relationship of parent
and child, re-establish confidence in
and enjoy the companionship of those
who are their own flesh and blood,
and that their mission had been
accomplished. Ijd, at 490.
The facts of the present case suggest that the trial Court
has also retained continuous jurisdiction over the matter,
by setting a review hearing date upon its entry of the
Order terminating Appellants parental rights.

Further,

Appellant's need for a hearing in this case is more
compelling, since he was not heard at all prior to the

o r i g i n a l termination order.

Thus to deny A p p e l l a n t ' s

motion to produce new testimony operated as a denial of due
process of law.
The facts of the instant case demonstrate secondary
reasons for finding a denial of due process.

The supplemental

petition seeking permanent deprivation of parental rights
was filed with the trial Court on November 14, 1972.
However, the proceedings as to Appellant were not conducted
until February 5, 1975, and concluded on May 8, 1975,
a period exceeding two years from the filing of the petition.
Appellant's whereabouts and readiness to appear in Court
were readily ascertainable from the date the petition was
filed until October 23, 1974, a period just under two years.
His whereabouts became readily ascertainable again on May
10, 1975, and have remained such since that date.
-24-
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Thus,

for reasons unknown to Appellant, the juvenile Court seems
to have been reluctant to adjudicate his parental rights,
at least that is until he became unavailable to appear at
such termination proceedings.

Once his whereabouts could

not be ascertained, the juvenile Court promptly proceeded
to hear the petition for deprivation of parental rights.
Then, once Appellant's whereabouts were again ascertainable,
and despite the fact that a hearing date for review of
the matter had been set, the juvenile Court resumed its
unwillingness to further adjucate Appellant's parental
rights.

This whoTe course of judicial conduct smacks of

abuse, and Appellant submits that such conduct operated as
a denial of due process of law as to him.

In particular,

that to deny Appellant the opportunity to produce additional
testimony, in view of the whole course of conduct by the
juvenile Court, amounted to both an abuse of discretion
and a denial of due process.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts, law and reasoning set forth herein,
the decision of the Second District Juvenile Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, should be reversed and Mr.
Wulfferstein's parental rights restored to him, or in the
alternative, the trial Court should be required to take
additional testimony before terminating Mr. Wulfferstein's
25
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parental rights.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day of

1976, I hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the office of the Attorney General, State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to the
Salt Lake County Attorney, 3522 South 700 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84119.
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APPENDIX
A F F I D A V I T OF ORIN JOHN
STATE OF UTAH

WULFFENSTEIN

)
I

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SS

)

ORIN JOHN W U L F F E N S T E I N , being first duly sworn
upon o a t h , deposes and s t a t e s :
T h a t , if he were p e r m i t t e d to adduce f u r t h e r testimony
and e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g the t e r m i n a t i o n of his parental

rights,

the f o l l o w i n g would be o f f e r e d :
1.

That he is the natural f a t h e r of Tammy

Summers

and Tina Marie S u m m e r s , m i n o r c h i l d r e n .
2.

That he desires to retain parental rights and

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o v e r said m i n o r - c h i l d r e n , i n c l u d i n g
visitation with
3.

regular

them.-

That he intends to e s t a b l i s h a family h o u s e h o l d

with said m i n o r children upon his release from the Utah State
P r i s on .
4.

That the trial court refused to resolve the con-

t r o v e r s y for a period e x c e e d i n g two (2) y e a r s from the filing
<r
of the P e t i t i o n , during which time he would have been

available

for a p p e a r a n c e .
5.

That he was unaware of the court p r o c e e d i n g s on

February 5, 1 9 7 5 , March 1 2 , 1 9 7 5 , and May 8, 1 9 7 5 , and would
have appeared if he had known of the h e a r i n g s . 6.

That he has been unable to support said m i n o r

children since he has been i n c a r c e r a t e d for the substantial
portion of t h e i r l i v e s .
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1.

That he made numerous attempts to arrange visi-

tation with the Division of Family Services while in prison
which proved
8.

unsuccessful,
That he was only permitted two (2) visits with

the children during his release in the Summer, 1 9 7 3 , despite
attempts made to arrange additional

visitation through the

Division of Family Services. ,.,..„......,.DATED this

day of A p r i l , 1 9 7 6 .

olL
i' ^li<~d
/ORIN JOHN'MULFFENSTEIN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

O /-_

day

of April, 1976.

/
/s- )-<AZs^n/J~Y
(0TARY PUBLIC ^
Residing at:
My commission e x p i r e s :

'C'^;)
19 Id /?&
*
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